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7  ORIENT/EAST-MED CORRIDOR: CHALLENGES  
  AND DEMANDS FOR THE RAIL NETWORK POLICIES
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Literature
Abstract 
As rail represents an eﬃcient and sustainable transport system, the Trans-European 
railway network has become subject to special attention from European transport 
policy. The political objectives are to shift 30 % of freight to rail by 2030, 50 % by 2050, 
and to reduce passenger trips on road and in the air. These make it necessary to devel-
op the deﬁned TEN-T core network rail corridors as a priority, which means eliminat-
ing bottlenecks along the corridors and increasing capacities and operation quality. 
This concerns the Orient/East-Med (OEM) Core Network Corridor as well. Consider-
able parts of the infrastructure of the railway network along the OEM Corridor is not 
compliant with some of the technical thresholds set out by EU-Regulation 1315/2013.
In the meanwhile the EU and the aﬀected states have established activities for extend-
ing the core network corridors to the Western Balkans states. In 2015, the European 
Commission adopted a Joint Statement of the Prime Ministers of six Western Balkans 
states (WB6), which contains a list of speciﬁed Core Network links and Priority Proj-
ects for the extension of the TEN-T network to the Western Balkans. During addition-
al common summits of the EU and the WB6, an indicative extension network has been 
more and more concretized. To date the process has led to the establishment of a 
common EU-Western Balkans Transport Community signed in 2017, which aims to 
help WB6 countries integrate into the EU by creating closer transport ties or connec-
tions. A continuing aspect is the importance of the OEM Corridor for the Chinese Belt 
and Road Initiative as a hinterland connection between the sea port of Piraeus (GR) 
and the central and eastern European countries.
Keywords
TEN-T – railway network – rail infrastructure – rail freight transport – Western Balkans 
States – New Silk Road
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Orient/East-Med Corridor: Herausforderungen und Ansprüche  
an Netz-Policies
Kurzfassung 
Als eﬃzienter und nachhaltiger Verkehrsträger hat die Schiene auch in der europäi-
schen Verkehrspolitik und somit auch im transeuropäischen Eisenbahnnetz besonde-
re Aufmerksamkeit bekommen. So sind als verkehrspolitische Ziele die Verlagerung 
von 30 % des Güterverkehrs auf die Schiene bis 2030, von 50 % bis 2050 und die Redu-
zierung des Personentransportes auf der Straße und in der Luft formuliert. Diese Zie-
le erfordern die vorrangige Entwicklung deﬁnierter TEN-V-Kernnetz-Eisenbahnkorri-
dore. Dies umfasst die Beseitigung von Engpässen entlang der Korridore, sowie die 
Steigerung von Kapazitäten und Betriebsqualitäten. Dies betriﬀt auch den Orient/
East-Med (OEM) Core Network Corridor. Große Teile der Infrastruktur des Eisen-
bahnnetzes entlang des OEM Corridors entsprechen nicht den technischen Standards 
der EU-Verordnung 1315/2013.
Mittlerweile haben die EU und die betroﬀenen Staaten Maßnahmen zur Ausweitung 
der Kernnetzkorridore auf die Westbalkanstaaten eingeleitet. Im Jahr 2015 verab-
schiedete die Europäische Kommission eine Gemeinsame Erklärung der Premierminis-
ter von sechs Westbalkanstaaten (WB6), die eine Liste speziﬁscher Kernnetzwerkver-
bindungen und prioritärer Projekte für die Ausdehnung des TEN-V-Netzes auf den 
Westbalkan beinhaltet. Bei weiteren gemeinsamen Gipfeltreﬀen der EU und der WB6 
wurde ein indikatives Erweiterungsnetz zunehmend konkreter. Dieser Prozess hat bis-
her zur Gründung einer gemeinsamen Verkehrsgemeinschaft EU-Westbalkan geführt, 
die 2017 unterzeichnet wurde und darauf abzielt, die Integration der WB6-Länder in 
die EU durch engere Verkehrsbeziehungen oder -verbindungen zu unterstützen. Ein 
weiterer Aspekt ist die Bedeutung des OEM Corridors für die Chinese Belt and Road 
Initiative als Hinterlandverbindung zwischen dem Seehafen Piräus (GR) und den mit-
tel- und osteuropäischen Ländern.
Schlüsselwörter
TEN-V – Eisenbahnnetz – Schieneninfrastruktur – Schienengüterverkehr – Westliche 
Balkanstaaten – Neue Seidenstraße
1 European policy and the TEN-T Orient/East-Med Core Network   
 Corridor 
The EU is backing the railway as an integral part of an eﬃcient and sustainable Euro-
pean transport system. The political objectives are ambitious: by 2030 30 % of road 
freight transport over 300 km should shift to rail, and this proportion should even rise 
to 50 % by 2050 (European Commission 2011). Evidently, substantial improvements 
are still necessary to reach these objectives and rail traﬃc must become a more Euro-
pean and hence cross-border issue than it is today. Major impetus to achieving these 
targets has already been provided by the liberalization of freight transport in 2007, the 
stipulation of the TEN-T (Trans-European Transport Network) corridors in 2009, 
when Corridor 22 as the pre-stage of the later Orient/East-Med Corridor was given its 
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original designation as one of the priority projects, and then the modiﬁcation in 2012 
under the name Orient/East-Med (OEM) Corridor (Corridor No. 3 of the nine TEN-T 
core network corridors).
Fig.1: The OEM TEN-T Core Network Corridor, alignment and nodes / Source: European Commission 2016
The OEM Corridor is a long north-west to south-east oriented corridor which con-
nects central and southeast Europe with the maritime interfaces of the North, Baltic, 
Black and Mediterranean Seas. It runs from the German ports of Hamburg, Bremer-
haven, Wilhelmshaven and Rostock in the north via the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
with a branch through Austria, further via Hungary and Romania towards the Bulgari-
an capital of Soﬁa (with links to the port of Burgas and to the Turkish border at Svilen-
grad), then to the Greek ports of Thessaloniki, Igoumenitsa, Patras and Athens/Pirae-
us and has a Motorway of the Sea link to Cyprus (Fig. 1). Maritime sea port 
infrastructure exists in four countries, namely Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany and Greece.
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The medium section between Vienna (Austria) and Craiova (Romania) superposes 
the ‘Rhine-Danube’ core network corridor Strasbourg–Constanta/Sulina which com-
prises the Danube inland waterway. So, the Danube waterway section between the 
river port of Vidin (BG) and the river port of Vienna (AT) is to be regarded as a sup-
plementary transportation route along the corridor although it is not part of the OEM. 
As the Rhine-Danube Corridor for rail and road runs exclusively through EU territory, 
the Danube waterway transits the exterritorial area of Serbia. 
Numerous missing links exist along the OEM with most of the multimodal connections 
between Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece yet to be constructed or substantial-
ly upgraded. The Elbe also requires important upgrades if it is to facilitate increased 
traﬃc ﬂows. Cross-border traﬃc management systems on rail and inland waterways 
are still to be implemented on many sections (European Commission 2017a).
2 Rail infrastructure along the Orient/East-Med Corridor
The rail infrastructure on the TEN-T core network shall meet all the requirements set 
out for the comprehensive TEN-T network, deﬁned in Chapter II of the TEN-T Guide-
lines (Regulation 1315/2013/EU). In addition, the following requirements shall be met 
by the railway transport infrastructure of the core network:
 > Full electriﬁcation of the line tracks
 > At least 22.5 t axle load, 100 km/h line speed and the possibility of running trains 
with a length of 740 m on freight lines 
 > Full deployment of ERTMS (European Rail Traﬃc Management System) 
 > Nominal track gauge for new railway lines: 1435 mm 
The infrastructure of the railway network along the OEM Corridor is in considerable 
parts of the alignment not compliant with some of the technical thresholds set out by 
Regulation 1315/2013, in particular regarding the key infrastructure parameters: train 
length and control system (ERTMS). For other technical characteristics such as oper-
ational speed (line speed), axle load and electriﬁcation, non-compliance along the 
corridor is around or below 20 % (European Commission 2016: 5 f. and European 
Commission 2017b: 16). The following information is based on European Commission 
2016 and European Commission 2017b:
Gauge and number of tracks
Concerning gauge and number of tracks, all OEM Corridor lines have a gauge of 1435 
mm (except Kiato-Patras which will be replaced by a 1435 mm gauge in the future). 
Most lines are at least double-tracked (approx. 71 %).
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Operational speed
A maximum operating speed of lower than 100 km/h is a barrier for freight trains along 
a total length of 1198 km (21 %). In detail there are small sections along the OEM Cor-
ridor in the Czech Republic (freight link Děčín–Ústí nad Labem), in Slovakia (Bratislava 
main station–Rajka, SK/HU border), in Hungary (Kelenföld–Köbanya–Kispest within 
Budapest node) and a few sections in Greece, where line speed is between 60 and 90 
km/h. Low maximum operating speed is particularly an issue if this occurs on longer 
sections, as in Bulgaria, where 75 % of the sections only permit operational speeds 
lower than 100 km/h and the weighted average operational speed is 90 km/h. Speciﬁ-
cally along the section Vidin–Soﬁa, the speed is 70–80 km/h, while part of the lines 
Soﬁa–Kulata has speed limits of only 60 km/h (Pernik–Radomir). Along the Bulgarian 
rail section Mihaylovo–Dimitrovgrad the operational speed is only 40 km/h. In further 
sections, the speed is restricted temporarily due to ongoing modernization works. 
Romania is, except for the section Craiova–Calafat, deemed to be fully compliant for 
this particular technical characteristic. In total, approx. 25 % of the OEM rail network 
is not compliant with the requirements of the regulation.
Train length 
Train length is a major issue along the entire corridor. On 2815 km (50 %) a train 
length of 740 m is not allowed due to infrastructural, administrative or timetable-re-
lated/operational reasons. Non-compliant with this parameter are all corridor sec-
tions in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Austria. On the Hungarian network only one 
section is not compliant, Hegyeshalom–Rajka, while in Greece several short sections 
do not match this criterion: Thessaloniki–Promahonas, Domokos–Tithorea, SKA–Pi-
raeus and Korinthos–Thriasio–SKA. In Romania only the sections HU/RO border–Arad, 
Filiaşi–Craiova and Golenti–RO/BG border are compliant, the same applies to the Bul-
garian sections RO/BG border–Vidin, Plovdiv–Burgas and Svilengrad–Turkish border. 
Longer parts of the Bulgarian and Romanian OEM rail network are non-compliant with 
this parameter. Germany complies fully with this technical requirement. In total ap-
prox. 53 % of the OEM rail network is not compliant.
Axle load
The minimum axle load of 22.5 t is a major problem for Hungary, Romania and Greece, 
summing up to 952 km (17 %) of the OEM rail network, in detail the entire rail network 
in Romania, and a number of line sections in Greece (Promahonas–Thessaloniki, 
Domokos–Tithorea and Inoi–SKA–Piraeus) and in Hungary (Kelenföld–Köbanya–Kisp-
est and Békéscsaba–Lökösháza). Additionally, in Hungary, there is a special situation 
on the line Budapest–Hegyeshalom, where an axle load of 22.5 t is permitted with a 
speed restriction of 120 km/h (above the limit of 100 km/h). In contrast, the bigger 
part of the rail network along the OEM Corridor is compliant with the minimum axle 
load threshold of 22.5 t.
Electriﬁcation
Most of the OEM rail network is electriﬁed (approx. 86 %), with three diﬀerent cur-
rent systems in use: AC 15 kV / 16.7 Hz (Germany and Austria), AC 25 kV / 50 Hz (south-
ern Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece) and DC 3 kV 
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(northern Czechia). Diesel traction is required only on the sections Oldenburg–
Sande–Wilhelmshaven in Germany, Craiova–Calafat in Romania, and Promahonas–
Thessaloniki, Domokos–Tithorea–Inoi, Tris Gefyres–Piraeus and Palaiofarsalos–Ka-
lambaka in Greece.
Railway control systems
Regarding railway control systems, at present, the national systems are still predomi-
nantly used on the OEM rail network. There is a considerable lack of ERTMS imple-
mentation, with diﬀerences between Member States. Regarding ERTMS, currently 
only 12 % of the OEM network is compliant with the required characteristics.
Cross-border issues
Some of the most challenging issues for seamless rail transport along the OEM Corri-
dor occur at borders. Technical, operational and administrative rules generate dispro-
portionally long waiting times here. To improve the situation and to discuss possible 
options for improvement, a working group on OEM Cross-Border Issues in Rail Trans-
port has been set up by the European Coordinator.
3 Strengthening the corridor for rail freight 
No comprehensive statistics are available for rail transport along the corridor routes. 
As a substitute and to get a picture about the rail freight situation in the countries in-
volved, Table 1 shows a compilation of the performance of rail freight transport up to 
2016 for each country.
Tab. 1: Performance of rail freight transport (billion tkm) in countries along the Rail Freight Corridor 7 
and Western Balkans 1970–2016 / Source: European Commission, Mobility and Transport 2018; Data: 
Eurostat, International Transport Forum, Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer, national statistics
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It can be seen that the transport performance on rail between 1970 and 1990 could 
not be equaled in the last 20 years, but has recovered since about the year 2000 on a 
lower level. It is conspicuous that – comparing the years 2000 and 2016 – in some 
countries smaller losses are registered, especially for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Romania and Slovakia. These countries are on the way to recovering the freight per-
formance on rail, but cannot yet equal the level of the year 2000. In the same period 
Germany, Hungary, Austria, Slovenia and Turkey raised their rail freight performance 
continuously and now exceed the level of the year 2000 considerably. Hence on the 
rail freight sector the challenges concerning the improvement of the OEM Corridor 
arise out of the following situation: on the one hand the corridor upgrading has to 
utilize and stimulate the recovering and slowly growing rail freight volume of the re-
gion and on the other hand it has to prevent slumps in particular countries along the 
corridor. 
Although the services of national and international freight transport were opened up 
to economic competition from 1 January 2007, elimination of ‘barriers’ between indi-
vidual countries has not yet been achieved suﬃciently. These barriers relate to border 
coordination, common investment plans concerning border stations and lines, com-
pliance with terms of delivery, reliability, coordination between the terminals etc. 
(RFC 7 Orient Corridor 2016b: Book V, Annex 5: 9).
The schematic map (Fig. 2) of the OEM Rail Freight Corridor 7 document shows im-
portant ‘interfaces’ for rail freight activities along the corridor. It shows clearly that 
the number of border crossings and handover points could generate delays and other 
imponderables on the train ﬂow. 
In normal daily business, the trains run according to their timetable, and there is no 
need for coordination or communication between the Train Control Centers (TCCs) 
on the corridor. If there is any signiﬁcant deviation from the timetable or in case of 
disruption regardless of the cause, communication and coordination between the re-
lated TCCs is necessary. The main tool to perform these tasks is the ‘TCCCom’, which 
is an internet-based multilingual communication application. The infrastructure man-
agers of the freight corridor and the advisory group of the RFC set up Train Perfor-
mance Management Coordination to ensure optimal coordination between the oper-
ation of the railway infrastructure and the customers (RFC 7 Orient Corridor 2016a: 
Book IV).
By means of the South East European Transport Observatory based in Belgrade, sev-
en regional partners cooperate in the transport domain to prepare for accession to 
the EU. The platform COSMOS (Cooperative Solutions for Managing Optimized Ser-
vices) deals with the market needs for improved cooperative intermodal freight ser-
vices in southeast Europe (COSMOS 2018). These measures are important steps but 
only some of the tesserae necessary to enable the OEM core network corridor to 
meet the future demands of international and transcontinental rail freight ﬂows.
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Fig. 2: Schematic map of ‘interfaces’ along the Orient/East-Med rail freight corridor (RFC 7) /  
Source: RFC 7 Orient Corridor 2016a: Book IV
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4 TEN-T extension in the Western Balkans
On EU territory, the Commission has given its backing to a study to assess the need for 
a rail link between Budapest and Athens via Timisoara (RO)–Calafat (RO)–Vidin 
(BG)–Thessaloniki (GR). Currently this link is not fully operational and support is 
needed to develop the link to the necessary extent.
Fig. 3: Indicative extension of the TEN-T Comprehensive Rail Network for the Western Balkans region 
published in Regulation 2013/1315/EU / Source: Regulation 1315/2013/EU, Annex III
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As an alternative, a shorter rail link between Budapest and Skopje–Athens on the ter-
ritory of Serbia and the Republic of North Macedonia is included in the indicative maps 
of the TEN-T extension (Regulation 1315/2013/EU, Annex III). This document presents 
indicative extension maps to speciﬁc third countries inter alia for six states of the 
Western Balkans Region: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of North Macedo-
nia, Kosovo,1 Montenegro and Serbia (Fig. 3). The rail connections in the document 
are considered as conventional rail links. They are not designated as links of the TEN- T 
core network but some of the links are on the way to becoming such. Nevertheless, 
the link between Budapest and Thessaloniki via Serbian territory could reduce the rail 
distance between Greece and Hungary by about 262 km (Endemann 2017).
In 2015, the European Commission adopted a Joint Statement of the Prime Ministers 
of the WB6, which contains a list of speciﬁed Core Network links and Priority Projects 
for the extension of the TEN-T network to the Western Balkans (European Commis-
sion 2015). Within the framework of the Connectivity Agenda during the Western 
Balkans Summit in Vienna 2015, the proposed alignment for the core network within 
the Western Balkans region was presented (Western Balkans Summit Vienna 2015). 
The addendum of the Final Declaration contains a list of links as ‘pre-identiﬁed proj-
ects’ (Western Balkans Summit Vienna 2015, Annex 1). It is remarkable that the rail 
link between Nis and Soﬁa via Dimitrovgrad is not included in the core network pro-
posal for the OEM Corridor but is set as a pre-identiﬁed project on ‘other sections on 
the core network’. In the ﬁnal report of the Study on Orient/East-Med TEN-T Core 
Network Corridor, 2nd phase 2017 (European Commission 2017c), the proposed core 
rail network comprises the sections (Fig. 4):
 > Budapest–Subotica–Beograd–Niš–Skopje–Gevgelija–Thessaloniki
 > Stalać–Kraljevo–Prishtine/Priština–Skopje (Trubarevo)
 > Beograd (Resnik)–Podgorica–Bar
In 2017, the EU-Western Balkans Transport Community Treaty (TCT) was signed and 
a common Transport Community of the EU and the WB6 was founded. The TCT’s goal 
is to help WB6 countries integrate into the EU by creating closer transport ties or 
connections (Balkans Policy Research Group 2018: 10). For the Balkans, the TCT of-
fers increased eﬃciency and competitiveness of transport and tourism, reduced trav-
el time and costs, and increased attractiveness for investments. Its purpose in the 
transport sector is 1) the ongoing development of the TEN-T indicative extension, by 
developing a 5-year rolling work plan every 2 years; 2) to promote necessary studies 
and analyses; and 3) to put in place an information system (European Union 2017 and 
2018; Niedermaier 2018).
1  This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and 
the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
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Fig. 4: Alignment of the OEM Corridor related to the Western Balkans core network (Rail) / Source: Eu-
ropean Commission 2017c
5 Function of the Orient/East-Med Corridor for the New Silk Road
In relation to the transport connection between Europe and the central Asian coun-
tries, the Republic of China launched the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI). Based on the 
ancient silk road it aims at enhancing overall connectivity between China and Europe 
by both building new and modernizing existing – overland as well as maritime – infra-
structures (Barisitz/Radzyner 2017a: 8–10). The motivations and drivers of China’s BRI 
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initiative are mostly of an economic or geopolitical nature: improvement of transport 
links; reduction of trade costs; reutilization of domestic overcapacities; diversiﬁcation 
of investments, markets and suppliers; development of peripheral domestic regions 
(e.  g. Xinjiang); contribution to the internationalization of the renminbi-yuan; en-
hancement of security of access to strategic energy and resource supplies; hedging 
against possible trade wars, etc. (Barisitz/Radzyner 2017a: 27). 
One strategic line of the initiative is – in addition to several Eurasia land corridors be-
tween China and Europe – the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) as a complemen-
tary seaborne trading network going from China’s coast to Europe, connecting China 
with Southeast Asia, South Asia, East Africa and the Mediterranean area. Accordingly, 
about 95 % of EU trade with China and 80 % of China’s total exports were carried out 
on this maritime route in 2015 (Barisitz/Radzyner 2017a: 16). Geographically, south-
east Europe (particularly Greece and the Western Balkans states) constitutes the ﬁnal 
section of China’s new Maritime Silk Road (MSR), reaching Europe via the Suez Canal 
and the port of Piraeus (Fig. 5).
The relevance of the Belt and Road Initiative for the OEM Corridor is set by Chinese 
investment in the sea port of Piraeus, where the Chinese shipping giant COSCO (China 
Ocean Shipping Group Company) Paciﬁc holds a 35-year concession to upgrade and 
run two container cargo piers (Vasovic 2014) – as the ﬁrst major European container 
port for ships entering the Mediterranean from the Suez Canal and the connected rail 
corridor leading from the port of Piraeus via Skopje (Republic of North Macedonia) 
and Belgrade (Serbia) to Budapest (Hungary). Ultimately under the BRI initiative, the 
rail upgrade helps the Chinese plan to turn Piraeus (Greece) into a regional hub for 
trade with central and eastern Europe. By actuating the port of Piraeus the transit 
time between Shanghai and Piraeus is about 22 days, which is 10 days shorter than the 
route between Shanghai and the northwest European ports of Rotterdam and Ham-
burg (Levitin 2016). In view of this cut in transit time, China has already announced its 
plans to buy into other sea ports such as Thessaloniki (Greece), or Bar (Montenegro) 
(Barisitz/Radzyner 2017b: 75).
In a roundabout way, the Piraeus development could possibly be seen as the beginning 
of developing Mediterranean ports as entrance ports for Asia–Europe sea trade 
routes in Europe. It can be assumed that more Hellenic and Adriatic ports, like for ex-
ample Patras, Piraeus, Thessaloniki, Bar, Rijeka, Koper and Trieste, will become more 
important in comparison with the northern European ports of Rotterdam, Hamburg 
and Antwerp. In this context, the Hellenic and Adriatic ports could be able to relieve 
pressure on the seaports-hinterland network in central Europe. The example of Pirae-
us gives a ﬁrst impression of the associated demands of a modiﬁed sea-port setting 
for the OEM Corridor. Nevertheless, a rerouting of hinterland connections on such a 
European dimension requires fully developed hinterland corridors. The seaports of 
Piraeus, Patras and Thessaloniki are considered part of the OEM core network corri-
dor and the seaport of Bar in its proposed extension is in Western Balkan territory, but 
the ports of Rijeka, Koper and Trieste are not part of the OEM Corridor, although their 
feeder function of sea freight ﬂows to central and eastern European countries could 
be similar. 
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Fig. 5: The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR)-Corridor (Mediterranean section: Suez-Canal- 
Piraeus-Belgrade-Budapest) of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) / Source: Barisitz/Radzyner 2017b: 
76; Original map from Google maps
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Related to the hinterland corridor of the sea port of Piraeus but also intended to im-
prove the transport exchanges between Hungary and the Western Balkan region, 
Hungary, Serbia, the Republic of North Macedonia and China signed an agreement on 
the modernization of the Budapest–Belgrade railroad in December 2014. The Bel-
grade–Budapest rail line is a 370-km modernization project implemented by Chinese 
companies with planned speeds of 200 km/h (CIP 2017). The project was proposed in 
early 2013, with an estimated cost of $2.9 billion, while the construction works started 
in 2017 for the ﬁrst section of the line in Serbia (eKapija 2018). The project includes 
electriﬁcation of the existing rail to have both passenger and cargo train services. The 
project is expected to shorten travel time from both ends of the line from 8 hours to 
2.5 hours. The railroad will be constructed with the ﬁnancial and technical support of 
China (Hungary Today 2014). 
Usually, projects like this, where the Republic of China is involved, are funded with 
loans from the state-owned Export-Import Bank of China (China EXIM Bank) that 
cover about 85 % of the required capital, with the rest being ﬁnanced by the local gov-
ernment or other local investors. Loans typically have a long maturity of about 20 
years and low interest rates (at approximately 2 %) (Barisitz/Radzyner 2017b: 76). Due 
to Chinese ﬁnancing, it is understandable that management is also often in Chinese 
hands and construction work is frequently carried out by Chinese ﬁrms and their 
workers, sourcing Chinese equipment, which is not always appreciated by local proj-
ect partners (Barisitz/Radzyner 2017a: 10).
However, the project is not seen as proﬁtable, as it was estimated that at least 6 million 
passengers annually are needed for the two countries to repay the Chinese loan for 
the project, while the combined populations of Belgrade and Budapest is only 3.1 mil-
lion, with fewer than 100,000 rail commuters in the regions yearly (B92 2015; People’s 
Daily Online 2016; Vasovic 2014). Despite the questionable proﬁtability, Serbia has 
reason to support this project. The new transport infrastructure can help its econom-
ic growth, in particular logistically. In this regard, Serbia is more inclined to downgrade 
the project to a less expensive, medium-speed one (Kratz/Pavlićević 2016). 
In October 2016, a Chinese-Hungarian joint venture company was established to start 
construction work. But in February 2017 the European Commission started investi-
gating whether the project for the construction of the high-speed railway in any way 
violated European laws concerning ﬁnancial feasibility and public procurement 
(Forbes 2017; Global Times 2017). Nevertheless, from the Chinese point of view the 
project also provides a market for China’s rail technology and rolling stock for high 
speed railways (Rogers 2016). 
Another possible future inﬂuencing factor on the OEM Corridor could be the align-
ment of the central branch of the New Silk Road rail freight corridor through the 
central Asian countries Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan via the Caucasus coun-
tries and Turkey to Europe (Müller/Winter 2018: 3 and 7). The gateway interface to 
the OEM core network corridor is Edirne (TR)/Svilengrad (BG). From there the rail 
route via Soﬁa enables an already expanding rail freight exchange between Turkey and 
the central and eastern European countries. In this context it is remarkable that the 
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rail link between Soﬁa (BG) and Nis (RS) via Dimitrovgrad (RS) is not designated as 
part of the TEN-T OEM related Western Balkans core network, though this rail link is 
in bad condition (operational speed is only 40 km/h). So, the rail route from Soﬁa via 
Romania to Hungary seems to be favored for these transport ﬂows.
The northern branch of the New Silk Road rail link contacts the OEM Corridor in the 
node of Budapest. It is important to mention that in the node of Budapest branches 
of three New Silk Road corridors (north, central and southern course) converge. Re-
lated to an agreement by the Russian, the Slovakian and the Austrian railways for an 
extension of the Russian broad gauge from the Ukrainian/Slovakian border to the Vi-
enna region by a particular broad-gauge rail passage the operative conjunction of the 
branches will be a challenge in adapting the OEM Corridor for freight distribution and 
feeder functions to/from Europe to Russia as well as to central and East Asia. 
Another approach to improving the transport connection of Greece to the central and 
eastern European region is worth mentioning. In 2017 the transport ministers of 
Greece and Bulgaria signed a memorandum of understanding for a rail freight corri-
dor between Thessaloniki (Greece) and the Danube port of Ruse (Bulgaria), connect-
ing also the sea ports of Kavala and Alexandroupoli in Greece as well as the Black Sea 
ports Burgas and Varna in Bulgaria. The time frame for realization is aimed (optimisti-
cally) to within 10 years and investment costs are approximately 5 billion euros (Eisen-
bahn-Revue International 2017). The proposition for this project shows that the OEM 
Corridor is not limited to a few axes but needs to be conceived more broadly. 
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